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On 19 May 2000, an insurrection led by failed businessman George 
Speight and seven renegade members of the élite 1st Meridian 
Squadron special forces engulfed the Fiji Islands in turmoil for the 
next three months. Speight and his armed co-conspirators stormed 
Parliament and seized the Labour-led Mahendra Chaudhry Government 
hostage for 56 days. On Chaudhry’s release from captivity, he partly 
blamed the media for the overthrow of his government. Some sectors 
of the media were accused of waging a bitter campaign against the 
Fiji Labour Party-led administration and its rollback of privatisation. In 
the early weeks of the insurrection, the media enjoyed an unusually 
close relationship with Speight and the hostage-takers, raising ethical 
questions. Dilemmas faced by Fiji and foreign journalists were more 
complex than during the 1987 military coups. As Fiji faces a fresh 
general election in August, this article examines the reportage of the 
Coalition Government’s year in office, media issues over coverage of 
the putsch, and a controversy over the author’s analysis presented 
at a Journalism Education Association (JEA) conference in Australia. 
The government of kidnapped Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry, Fiji’s only Indo-Fijian prime minister in thirty years of 
independence, achieved economic success in its one year in office. 
Indo-Fijians make up a minority 44 percent of the island nation’s 
800,000 population. But on Friday, 19 May 2000, failed businessman 
and kailoma (part-Fijian) George Speight, along with seven renegade 
soldiers from the élite 1st Meridian Squadron forces stormed 
Parliament and took the Chaudhry Government hostage in the name 
of “indigenous Fijian supremacy”. “We’re not going to apologise to 
anybody and we’re not going to step back, and we’re not going to 
be daunted by accusations of racism, or one-sidedness,” Speight 
declared. “At the end of the day, it is about the supreme rights of our 
indigenous people in Fiji, the desire that it be returned — wholesome 
and preserved for the future.” (Robie, 2000a: 19) 
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Many of Speight’s group, like their leader, had dubious reputations: 
only five days before the coup, Speight appeared in Suva’s High Court 
on charges of extortion. He also had a grievance against Chaudhry’s 
government for his dismissal as chief executive from Fiji Hardwood 
Corporation Ltd, and also from Fiji Pine Ltd. Chiefly associates stood 
to lose lucrative timber deals if Chaudhry had remained in office.
However, Speight essentially achieved his aims, before releasing 
his key hostages: purported abrogation of the multiracial 1997 
Constitution, written after the coup of 1987 and replacing the 1990 
Constitution which enshrined “Fijian paramountcy” (but kept Fiji 
excluded from the Commonwealth); the de facto resignation of 
the 80-year-old President, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara; a non-elected 
indigenous administration; and an amnesty for the kidnappers. (The 
core group was later charged with treason, a capital offence in Fiji). 
Meanwhile, the country was plunged into economic chaos.
A year after the attempted coup, a military installed interim régime 
declared illegal by the Fiji Court of Appeal on 1 March 2001 had been 
reinstated by President Josefa Iloilo as a caretaker Government to 
steer the country uncertainly towards a general election on August 
26; hundreds of impoverished families were “living in atrocious 
conditions ... because of the madcap escapades of George Speight 
and his goons” (Turaga, 2001); preliminary treason court hearings 
had been opened against 12 alleged plotters; and Suva newspaper 
retrospectives were reluctant to look too closely at controversy over 
the media’s performance during the crisis.
When Chaudhry was released from captivity on July 14,  he partly 
blamed the media for the overthrow of his government (Fiji One News, 
2000). Some sectors of the media were alleged to have waged a bitter 
campaign against the People’s Coalition Government and its rollback 
of privatisation in the year after the Fiji Labour Party-led coalition had 
been elected in a landslide victory in May 1999 (Pacific Journalism 
Review, 2000: 134-164). In the early weeks of the insurrection, the 
media enjoyed an unusually close relationship with Speight and the 
hostage-takers, raising ethical questions. (see Field; Parkinson; Robie, 
2000b) 
This article examines the media controversy leading up to the 
putsch, the coverage of the crisis itself and analyses the role of the 
media as a factor in the upheaval. It also considers political sympathies 
of journalists, news organisations, and a hostile response from some 
media industry executives in Fiji to an earlier version of this article (full 
text at: www.asiapac.org.fj/cafepacific/resources/aspac/fiji3148a.html) 
delivered at the Journalism Education Association (JEA) conference at 
Mooloolaba, Queensland, in December. 
Fiji has a highly developed media industry compared with most 
other Pacific countries. Until 2000,  it had four major monthly or 
bimonthly news magazine groups, Islands Business International, 
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Pacific Islands Monthly (Murdoch), The Review and Fiji First (both 
locally owned). However, Fiji First faded from the public eye and PIM, 
the region’s oldest and for many years the most influential magazine, 
announced its closure a month after the putsch. Islands Business was 
relaunched as the southern edition of Pacific Magazine in January 
2000 after a merger with the Hawai’i-based publisher, Pacific Basin 
Communications. The three daily newspapers are the Rupert Murdoch-
owned Fiji Times (circulation reportedly up to 55,000 during the Fiji 
crisis but usually around 32,000 week days) and the struggling Fiji 
government-owned Daily Post, with a third daily, The Sun, which was 
launched in September 1999.  (The Sun is owned by a consortium of 
Indo-Fijian importers, C J Patel and Co Ltd and Vinod Patel and Co Ltd, 
and the flagship company of Fiji’s caretaker régime, Fijian Holdings 
Ltd.) The two smaller dailies do not have independently audited sales, 
but are both believed to sell around 6000 copies a day. Broadcasters 
are Fiji Television Ltd, which has one free-to-air channel and two pay 
channels; the private Communications Fiji Ltd (FM96) radio group; and 
the state-owned Fiji Broadcasting Corporation. The Daily Post and The 
Review news magazine share a website, FijiLive, while The Fiji Times is 
hosted at FM96’s Fiji Village website. 
On 15 May 1987, Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka’s régime 
ordered both  newspapers, The Fiji Times and the original Fiji Sun, to 
stop publishing indefinitely while armed troops and police occupied 
the two offices. The next day, May 16, became the first time (apart from 
once during a hurricane in January 1986) in more than a century that 
The Fiji Times was not published. The military régime began a purge of 
political critics and opponents by arresting them without charge. The 
Fiji Sun, jointly owned by the Hongkong-based Sally Aw Sian publishing 
empire and New Zealand publisher Philip Harkness, eventually closed 
rather than publish under self-censorship restrictions.
There was an exodus of experienced journalists from Fiji after the 
Rabuka coups. At the start of the Speight attempted coup, the bulk 
of Fiji journalists were young, relatively untrained and with limited 
experience. The median age of journalists was 22 with a large bulge 
in the 21-25 age group. Almost half of Fiji journalists (47 percent) had 
no professional or educational qualifications at all, and the median 
experience was 2.5 years. (Robie, 1999a) 
In May 1999, the Fiji Labour Party won the largest electoral 
mandate since the country became independent in 1970. After more 
than a decade as an opposition leader and robust trade union leader, 
and a seemingly good working relationship with journalists, Mahendra 
Chaudhry got off on the wrong foot with the media industry virtually 
from the day he took office. The appointment of his son, Rajendra, as 
his Private Secretary deeply damaged his credibility with the media 
and the public. Political commentator Jone Dakuvula observes that 
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the Coalition Government was on the defensive from day one: “There 
was no honeymoon period” (Dakuvula, 2000a). But Chaudhry and the 
People’s Coalition had the most concern over The Fiji Times, arguably 
the country’s most influential news organisation. Over the next few 
months, The Fiji Times appeared to wage a campaign against the 
fledgling government. According to deposed National Planning 
Minister Dr Ganesh Chand, an economist and former academic at the 
University of the South Pacific:
One of their lines was that we were not delivering our manifesto 
immediately; numerous editorials were written on this, and the general 
tenor of the articles, the locations, the pictures, focus, and most of all, 
the inaccuracies, all were anti-government. I complained to the [Fiji] 
Media Council (1) numerous times and judgements against The Fiji 
Times began coming out. (Chand, 2000.)
According to researcher Nwomye Obini of USP’s Department of 
Development Studies, who conducted a content analysis of Fiji Times 
coverage on the Chaudhry Government’s year in office and the coup, 
the newspaper  “bombarded” the prime minister with problems in 
both editorials and news reports in contrast to previous governments. 
(Obini, 2000) As the date of the coup approached, 
The tension grew day by day. Nurses kept making threats, and 
finally went on strike on May 12, a week before the coup ... A rift was 
even reported between the Commissioner of Police and the Prime 
Minister. (Ibid.: 15)
Michael Field, a veteran Pacific Affairs reporter for Agence France-
Presse news agency, considers several events were covered with a 
“fixed” approach which encouraged an unfairly negative impression 
of the Coalition.
One was the infamous tea lady incident which helped create 
an air, I suppose, of corruption or immorality in the newly elected 
government. My own view of this was that it was something of a set 
up job in which the media went along for the ride, and may have, in 
the longer run, helped to destabilise the government ... (Field, 2000a)
Field also makes the point that the election result was “remarkably 
clear but the media, or elements of it, were reluctant to accept it”. Some 
sections of the media were in his view “arrogantly anti-democratic”. 
Also, some of the journalistic decision-making was personal. Dakuvula 
regards The Fiji Times as an example of a newspaper which was 
“blatantly antagonistic” to the Government: 
The agenda of The Fiji Times was to delegitimise the elected 
Government by creating a climate of scandal, loathing and fear so the 
Fiji Labour Party, at least, would not be able to effectively implement 
its manifesto. (Dakuvula, 2000b) 
Part of the blame lay with the Coalition Government itself. There 
was no evidence that the administration tried to develop a media 
strategy to establish positive relationships with journalists and use 
contemporary “spin” techniques to sell its reforms to the public. But 
Fiji 
Islands 
and the 
media
Chaudhry 
and the 
media
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sociologist Dr Sitiveni Ratuva argues that the Chaudhry Government’s 
poor relationship with the media was a weakness shared with the 
previous Rabuka administration. 
Both governments had information ministers who did not know 
how to handle public relations matters, especially how to deal with 
the media. They were both confrontational. The media’s response also 
took the same line — confrontational. The media portrayed Rabuka 
and company as corrupt and inefficient and Chaudhry as arrogant and 
anti-Fijian. (Ratuva, 2000)
According to Ratuva, the portrayal of Chaudhry basically fed into 
the rising tide of ethno-nationalist mobilisation. Although the media 
did not create the conditions for the ethno-nationalist upsurge, it did 
provide the nationalists with the “legitimacy” to roll on. For media 
analyst Pramila Devi, this was nothing new. In a paper almost a decade 
earlier, analysing the 1992 general election campaign, she had found 
both The Fiji Times and the Daily Post  practised “self-censorship” with 
a “bias towards a certain ideology”:
It is the same ideology that is shared by the [Great] Council of 
Chiefs, the military, the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) and 
large segments of the ethnic Fijian population. That putting this 
ideology in practice relegates half of Fiji’s population to a third-class 
citizenry did not matter. (Devi, 1992: 35)
Decisions by the Chaudhry Government not to renew the work 
permit for reappointed Fiji Times editor-in-chief, Russell Hunter, a 
former senior journalist on The Australian, and to block Canadian 
Ken Clark’s work permit after he was appointed chief executive of 
Fiji Television Ltd — both cases leading to legal action — alienated 
the media from Government (2). Another important factor was the 
commercial interests of large businesses, major advertisers and 
corporate opponents of the Coalition Government’s efforts at rolling 
back the privatisation policies adopted by the Rabuka Government. 
As the Government’s relationship soured further, “payback” time 
finally came for the press. Chaudhry chose an invitation by the Media 
Council to launch the Fiji General Media Code of Ethics and Practice 
on 26 October 1999 to deliver an extraordinary speech damning the 
Fiji news media generally, singling out three media organisations 
and prominent individual journalists. Chaudhry indicated that his 
government was considering establishing a “swift justice” media 
tribunal to provide remedies in defamation cases. Moves were also 
considered to licence foreign-owned media with an annual fee of 
$20,000. (The Sun, 1999a) 
The tribunal proposal, in particular, prompted Pacific Islands 
News Association (PINA) president William Parkinson to complain: 
“[Chaudhry’s] attacks against the media were draconian to say the least. 
We have not had those threats made since the military government 
in 1987” (Ibid.) Parkinson, managing director of Communications (Fiji) 
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Ltd, owners of FM96 in Fiji and stakeholders in radio stations in Papua 
New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, said he was seriously concerned. 
Chaudhry questioned whether international media and local media 
were suffering a “crisis of ethics” and falling credibility. 
When day after day a particular reporter writes nothing but anti-
government stories with facts manipulated and distorted to discredit 
and embarrass the government, one is left in little doubt as to what 
the agenda of the particular reporter is. (Chaudhry, 1999)
Senior political reporter Margaret Wise, who has close links with 
the party founded by former coup leader and prime minister Sitiveni 
Rabuka, Soqosoqo Ni Vakavulewa Ni Taukei (SVT), was clearly the 
journalist Chaudhry had in mind. He named her later in the speech. 
Wise has been publicly questioned over her style of journalism 
(see Robie, 1999c: 115), alleged partisan beliefs, accusations of 
“skirt journalism” tactics, and close ties with Rabuka. So-called skirt 
journalism was given public prominence by Weekend newspaper 
publisher Josefa Nata over a series of exposés about women in Rabuka’s 
life when another prominent journalist was named (3). Hinting that the 
newspaper could be breaching the Public Order Act, Chaudhry said:
The matter is even more serious than a breach of media ethics 
and my Government is quite concerned at what is happening. Is The 
Fiji Times carrying the torch for people engaged in seditious activities? 
The newspaper needs to take a serious look at where it is headed. Is it 
not fanning the fires of sedition and communalism by giving undue 
prominence to stories that are really non-stories? (Chaudhry, 1999)
Reaction was confined to defensive statements from media 
industry people, but with no initial publication of the speech. Nor did 
the media canvas civil society opinions. The Government responded 
to what it called “media hysteria” with eight-page advertisements 
— including the speech — in both The Sun and Daily Post,  costing 
$16,000 at taxpayers’ expense. (Fiji Sun, 2000). The Fiji Times 
voluntarilypublished Chaudhry’s speech after four days and responded 
with a two-page editorial. Describing the speech as a “rambling diatribe 
riddled with contradictions, half truths and untruths”, the editorial 
added: 
Chaudhry has been escalating his attacks on the media — in 
particular the country’s most successful news organisation, The Fiji 
Times — in an effort to create a climate in which the public would be 
softened up for his draconian legislation. (Fiji Times, 1999)
However, the self-interest of media responses did not go unnoticed 
by the president of the Fiji chapter of Transparency International, Ikbal 
Jannif: “It seems to me that media wants accountability — for everyone 
except itself.” (Jannif, 1999: 164)
After putschist Speight and his gunmen kidnapped the Coalition 
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Government, it was astonishing how “captive the journalists were to 
Speight” (see Robie, 2000b, 2000d; Parkinson; Woodley; Field 2000b). 
In a sense they were hostages too, even providing a human shield at 
times of confrontation between the rebel group and the military at 
checkpoints: “The media pack offered Speight a profile and credibility 
— it aided the rebel leader’s propaganda war.” 
Even though essentially it was a struggle for power within the 
indigenous Fijian community, and a conflict between tradition and 
modernity, the inevitable polarisation of races undermined objectivity. 
It was apparent to then Daily Post editor Jale Moala that many local 
reporters had become “confused by the heightened emotion at the 
time, the use of emotive language and the pleadings of the opposing 
forces”, as they were drawn into different sides. (Moala, 2000) This, he 
recalls, was true of both indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian reporters. 
Fear may have also played a role. As a result, the perpetrators of 
the terrorist action, led by George Speight, received publicity that at 
the time seemed to legitimise their actions and their existence. Some 
argued that the situation may not have deteriorated as quickly as it 
did if the media had played a more responsible role. 
But therein lies one of the dilemmas of Pacific Islands political 
journalism: the extended family system, the tribal and chiefly system 
and customary obligations may blur the view of the journalist, 
especially if he or she is indigenous. (Moala, 2001: 125-126) 
Moala (Ibid.: 127) points to an example of a Fijian journalist 
falling foul of a high chief. Josefa Nata, an investigative journalist 
and journalism trainer who had “cut his teeth” at the original Fiji Sun 
newspaper, exposed the business dealings of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, 
who at the time had been Fiji’s prime minister since independence 
from Britain in 1970. He was treated as an outcast. Nata later gained 
notoriety as Speight’s media spin doctor and is now on Nukulau prison 
isle awaiting trial for treason (4). 
For Moala, lack of leadership in some newsrooms was a significant 
factor. Observed Michael Field: “I left [Fiji, after two months, and as the 
longest-serving foreign reporter] wondering how much of the coup 
and its twists and turns was the product of the media itself”. (Field, 
2000c) International  journalists highlighted the inexperience of some 
local journalists. According to The Australian’s Brian Woodley:  
They got on with reporting the story, a corps of dedicated 
youngsters with hardly a gram of experience among them. Most are 
not long out of high school. (Woodley, 2000)
Indeed, there was a steep learning curve for Fiji journalists but 
with many showing remarkable courage and commitment. It was a 
harrowing and testing time for the country’s media — the dilemmas 
were far more complex than during the 1987 coups.  Radio Fiji’s general 
manager (public broadcasting) Francis Herman said: “Our journalists 
have been threatened, abused, beaten, had stones thrown at them 
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— it goes with the job”. (Herman, 2000) But it was also a time when 
professionalism needed to rise another notch. Moala considered some 
reporters stayed too long in the parliamentary complex, “making 
the outside world believe they were enjoying the hospitality of the 
terrorists and becoming too familiar with them” (Moala, 2001: 129) 
At times, there was strong sympathy among some journalists for the 
“cause”, even among senior editorial executives. There was tension 
between the role of “objective” journalist and an instinctive feeling 
about what should happen in the country. 
One of the news organisations that drafted a policy to cope 
with the crisis was the Daily Post . It covered the putsch with perhaps 
greater caution than some other local media. In the early stages, the 
newspaper established guidelines for reporters, photographers and 
subeditors. Along with the code, it sought greater emphasis on the 
“effects” of the crisis on the people and the economy and downplayed 
events inside the parliamentary complex. Guidelines were not formally 
written, in case they got into the hands of rebels and became a source 
of threats or reprisals as happened in the trashing of Fiji Television on 
28 November 2000 (Robie 2000b: 8). The guidelines: 
1. The newspaper would not use the word “coup” in its coverage.
2. The events of May 19 would be reported as a kidnapping 
and hostage crisis; George Speight was to be reported as either the 
leader of the kidnappers, the gunmen or the hostage takers, but 
never as “coup leader” to avoid giving him legitimacy in the minds of 
indigenous Fijians.
3. The group who stormed Parliament were to be described as 
“gunmen”, “terrorists” and “kidnappers”.
4. Use of photographs of George Speight and his supporters inside 
the parliamentary complex were to be restricted to avoid giving them 
too much publicity.
5. George Speight was never to be described  as a nationalist 
working for indigenous Fijian interests; he was to be reported as Suva 
businessman George Speight, leader of the kidnappers, or leader of 
the terrorists. (Moala, 2001: 131)
Some news media regularly switched reporters covering events 
inside the parliamentary complex to prevent them getting too close 
to the rebels. But in spite of precautions taken by news media groups 
to defend their integrity — FM96 ran editorial policy notices on air, 
effectively saying “trust us” — news media credibility was eroded. 
A senior executive and two news staff of Radio Fiji by the military 
were detained by the military on October 20 in an attempt to intimidate 
them into revealing their sources about a major split in the military. 
Although the highly sensitive news story itself was evidently well-
sourced — demonstrated by a mutiny two weeks later on November 
2, claiming the lives of eight soldiers — it lacked balance, such as 
official comment. 
The coup 
coverage
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Deposed minister Dr Ganesh Chand accused The Fiji Times  of 
destabilising the Coalition Government during its one year in office 
before being ousted by “waging a war” through articles and the courts 
when the Government refused to extend editor-in-chief Russell Hunter’s 
work permit; losing most complaints lodged by his government with 
the Fiji Media Council (1); of employing a senior journalist alleged to 
have close relationships with two prominent political personalities; and 
of its northern reporter “riding around with rebels” at Labasa on Vanua 
Levu Island. (Coalition, 2000) Publisher Alan Robinson described the 
attack as “grossly defamatory”, adding that the allegations “contained 
not the tiniest grain of truth”. (Fiji Times, 2000a) The following day, 
The Fiji Times published a front page story, alleging that police were 
investigating the “stripping” of government-owned furniture and other 
household goods from Chand’s state home. (Fiji Times, 2000b) Chand 
filed a defamation writ against the newspaper. (High Court, 2000) and 
the police investigation was dropped.
In another incident, two journalists based in Labasa were arrested. 
The Fiji Times and Radio Fiji’s northern correspondents were charged 
on November 13 with unlawful assembly and unlawful use of a motor 
vehicle over the seizure of a military barracks by rebels. (Pacific Media 
Watch, 2000). They were publicly defended by their editors, but it took 
almost six months before the charges were eventually withdrawn on 
May 11.
After this paper was originally presented at the JEA conference 
on December 6, a PINA Nius Online email report misrepresenting the 
paper was distributed to Pacific newspapers five days later, stirring 
up a “political storm” (see Café Pacific, 2001). A campaign of bitter 
personal attacks against the author followed on the JEANet and Penang 
Commonwealth editors email listserves over the next two weeks. A 
two-page article published in Pacific magazine presented the furore as 
a 12-round “boxing match” fought out on the internet, heavily slanted 
in favour of The Fiji Times and PINA (Pacific, 2001). The magazine cited 
a formal complaint by the newspaper’s expatriate publisher and editor-
in-chief to the University of the South Pacific, alleging “manufactured 
‘evidence’ to establish an erroneous conclusion” (rejected by the 
university). The magazine did not interview the author or seek a copy 
of the paper, nor did it canvas views of other media commentators 
supporting the analysis. 
The author replied to the attacks in an interview with Myra 
Mortensen broadcast on Radio Australia’s Pacific Beat, saying it was 
an irony that news organisations claiming to support media freedom 
were trying to gag a journalism academic. (Radio Australia, 2000) 
New Zealand Herald columnist Gordon McLauchlan wrote that USP 
had courageously “upheld academic freedom and firmly opposed 
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this deplorable attempt at censorship by journalists” (McLauchlan, 
2001) Rejecting the Fiji Times criticisms and protesting against Pacific 
magazine’s misrepresentations, Association of University of the 
South Pacific Staff (AUSPS) spokesperson Associate Professor Scott 
MacWilliam said in a letter to the editor: 
AUSPS is concerned that while The Fiji Times and other news 
organisations purport to support the freedom to express opinions, such 
opinions are only acceptable if they sustain the same organisations’ 
views of themselves. (MacWilliam, 2001) 
While the author’s main arguments were never published in the 
Fiji media, other views of foreign journalists who do not live in Fiji but 
which supported The Fiji Times/PINA perspective were (see The Sun, 
2001a, 2001b; Daily Post, 2001). Reprisals were threatened against the 
journalism programme at USP, but there is no evidence that students 
suffered from the controversy. USP journalism students had also 
covered the crisis, winning Ossie Awards for their efforts, and graduates 
are employed at 15 news organisations across the Pacific (Robie, 2000d) 
On the anniversary of the attempted coup, Fiji newspapers 
were reluctant to debate the shortcomings of crisis coverage. In the 
only article published examining the media and the coup, The Sun’s 
Samisoni Pareti cited two diplomats as supporting the view that 
coverage was “not that bad”. However, Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, 
writing in The Australian, had earlier questioned whether the local press 
should bear some of the responsibility for the political turmoil that had 
engulfed the South Pacific. (O’Callaghan, 2000) Remarked Michael Field 
in the Fiji Times: “The problem is that in Fiji there are more and more 
politicians, supported by a cabal in the local media that makes war on 
other reporters, who say they are not part of this world and wish to be 
left alone.” (Field, 2001)
The media climate after the general election in May 1999 arguably 
carried some responsibilty for misconceptions about the People’s 
Coalition Government in Fiji. No journalist seriously analysed the 
manifesto of the Fiji Labour Party in order to help public understanding 
of what the Government had pledged to do. It had been the intention 
of the Coalition Government to publish a special supplement in The 
Fiji Times marking its achievements after one year in office. However, 
the supplement, dated May 20, the day after the putsch took place, 
was dumped. The only serious analysis of the deposed government’s 
performance was written by Fiji Times features editor Bernadette 
Hussain and published in a USP journalism programme training 
newspaper (Wansolwara, 2000b) and matched by Agence France 
Presse. 
Hussain concluded that the Coalition Government had been 
seriously misrepresented. Outlining many of the achievements — 
The media 
response
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such as scholarships and an integrated village development project 
totalling F$12 million for affirmative action; reducing the cost of living 
for poor people of all races by removing customs duty and value added 
tax for essential food items such as rice, flour, cooking oil, tinned fish, 
powdered milk and tea; and increasing welfare allocations for the 
disadvantaged from F$3.3 million to $11 million — it was clear that the 
Government was “genuinely concerned about the plight” of ordinary 
citizens. In the nine months since Hussain’s article, few journalists have 
attempted to analyse the privatisation policies reasserted by the Qarase 
government without a mandate. The best éxpose has been a 53-minute 
video documentary, In the Name of Growth, about the exploitation of 
indigenous women workers by an indigenous company, the PAFCO 
tuna canning plant at Levuka. This was made by filmmaker  ‘Atu 
Emberson-Bain, a deposed Labour senator and former USP academic. 
(Emberson-Bain, 2001)
Critics regard The Fiji Times, in particular, as having had a hostile 
editorial stance towards the Chaudhry Government. In spite of claims 
that it has treated all governments similarly, the newspaper is viewed by 
critics as antagonistic and arrogant. The focus of news media coverage 
after the election was to play up conflict. Politics were portrayed as an 
arena of conflict between the new multiracial reformist government 
and the conservative indigenous opposition. Coverage did not improve 
after the Qarase régime consolidated its hold on power. In contrast 
with media coverage after the 1987 coups, democratic values were 
not so vigorously defended.
While the news media was fairly diligent, and at times courageous 
when reporting hard news developments, and the views of prominent 
politicians, and political parties during the conflict, it was not so 
effective at covering civil society’s perspectives. Fiji lacks enough 
critically thinking journalists who can provide in-depth, perceptive and 
balanced articles and commentaries. Most serious commentaries and 
analysis during the crisis were provided by non-journalists. 
The political scene in Fiji is still highly uncertain and there are 
confusing scenarios about the result of the forthcoming election, 
even rumours of a further coup should the Fiji Labour Party retain a 
majority. It is critical that the Fiji news media maintain independent 
coverage of political and socio-economic developments. But it is also 
equally vital that independent journalists, media commentators and 
academics sustain critical assessments of the role of the media in the 
wake of the putsch and in future nation-building.
NOTES
1. Adjudications were made by the [Fiji] Media Council over three complaints 
by Dr Chand against The Fiji Times and two against Fiji Television. In the 
case of the three complaints against The Fiji Times, No 90 on 11 November 
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1999 was upheld, No 101 (undated, 2000) partially upheld, and No 102 
(undated, 2000) dismissed; however both complaints against Fiji Television 
(Nos 99 and 100, undated) were upheld.
2. Ken Clark was eventually granted a two-year work permit, although he was 
on a three-year contract; Russell Hunter returned to Fiji in August 2000 on 
a further three-year-contract after he appealed to the interim authorities. 
3. The term “skirt journalism” in Fiji implies the use of sexual relations to gain 
privileged information from politicians. For other accounts of examples 
of alleged skirt  journalism, see Jo Nata (1994), “Why we did not publish: 
The other woman”, The Weekender; “Rabuka and the Reporter,” Pacific 
Journalism Review (1994), 1 (1) 20-22;  Jale Moala (2001). “Political reporting 
and editorial balance”, p 133, in David Robie (ed), The Pacific Journalist.
4. Jo Nata is also former coordinator of the Fiji Journalism Institute, the training 
arm of the Fiji Islands Media Association (FIMA), which has been defunct 
since 1998 amid controversy over its donor-provided funds. 
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